• Welcome to the new Internet Infidels Discussion Board, formerly Talk Freethought.

Boeing Shares Plunge and Recover Post Plane Crash

...
I'm guessing Boeing's insurance rates are going to spike.

I'm guessing not likely. They tend to self-insure on everything, so it will lower or zero out dividends. Executives will likely have managed to sell off a lot of their stock after the buzz from the Lion Air crash died down. They were telling everyone else that the first crash was an aberration, but I doubt that they would risk family fortunes on a bet that there would be no future disasters. They would not have wanted the stock price to plunge too much until they had secured their own investment strategies.
 
Meanwhile:

article said:
The meeting between the pilots and Boeing happened in November -- just weeks after an October crash of a Lion Air 737 Max into the Java Sea, and four months before a 737 Max operated by Ethiopian Air crashed in Ethiopia.

On the audio, a Boeing official is heard telling pilots that software changes were coming, perhaps in as little as six weeks, but that the company didn't want to hurry the process.

The pilots indicated they weren't aware of the 737 Max's computerized stability program -- the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS.

"We flat out deserve to know what is on our airplanes," a pilot is heard saying.

The revelation of the issue was known in 2017.

article said:
A new statement from Boeing indicates that the aerospace manufacturer knew about a problem with the 737 Max aircraft well before the deadly October 2018 Lion Air crash, but decided not to immediately do anything about it.

Boeing previously acknowledged that an alert system that was supposed to be a standard feature in the fleet "was not operable on all airplanes."

But a statement released Sunday describes a troubling timeline that shows how long some at the company were aware of the problem before finally deciding to act.

In its statement Sunday, Boeing maintained that the software issue "did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation."
I'm guessing Boeing's insurance rates are going to spike.
This should be a real scandal, but it is not.
 
...
I'm guessing Boeing's insurance rates are going to spike.

I'm guessing not likely. They tend to self-insure on everything, so it will lower or zero out dividends. Executives will likely have managed to sell off a lot of their stock after the buzz from the Lion Air crash died down. They were telling everyone else that the first crash was an aberration, but I doubt that they would risk family fortunes on a bet that there would be no future disasters. They would not have wanted the stock price to plunge too much until they had secured their own investment strategies.
I assumed they'd have disaster insurance for catastrophes such as crashes caused by ungodly poor management.
 
Stock prices in Fortune 500 companies are driven largely trading algorithms, so there was a stampede to sell Boeing stocks as soon as news hit the market. Those same algorithms will trigger a buying spree, once the falling stocks reach a certain threshold. Stock analysts try to rationalize these buying patterns, but they usually have very little to do with human judgment. Like so many of our aircraft, the stock markets are on autopilot.
This then leads to my point about Merck and Vioxx. Sure, you have the immediate response, but in the end, the Market doesn't give a fuck. Over 300 people dead. It'll be alright.

I don't honestly believe that. I worked for 25 years at Boeing, and this kind of accident devastates everyone. It isn't just their own welfare or fortunes that they are thinking of. There is a very strong culture of safety there. Not everyone is a Martin Shkreli.

I fear that this crash was caused by a very buggy new flight control system, just like the Lion Air crash. If so, then the pilots of this aircraft should have been prepared to shut down that system the moment the aircraft started to plummet. However, it will take some time before we know what the real cause was. It doesn't help to jump to hasty conclusions. Right now, the companies have to deal with the horror that families and loved ones of the victims are experiencing.
Sorry, I've seen the sort of software they release from the inside out, in fact the flight control software. I can't really square that with "very strong culture of safety".

Every time, that culture of safety has taken a back seat to their profit motive and IP concerns.

I sat down just this last week with the lead on that RE/rehost project, and we chatted yet again for about an hour out of the three we were together about the shit they let be delivered.

Last I knew there were STILL some uninitialized variables in the Hamilton Sunstrand junk.

And let's not pretend they're overly concerned with pilot competence when they charge well over a million dollars just for the rehost licensing/data package on top of any other simulator costs. Most aircraft company licenses for simulator rehosts (Airbus) are much, much cheaper.

Then, both Boeing and Airbus could get much better training technologies built up, if they were to actually release their system description documents. The only reason I can imagine they wouldn't is to prevent other companies from rising as competition (despite the fact this would improve aircraft quality), and maybe to hide the deficiencies in those documents.

The best cure for such is the light of day, and in my experience Boeing seems rather Nosferatu on that front.

Bear in mind that this comes from a specific view of the Boeing taken as a snapshot BEFORE the crashes and the maintenance issues came to light. Still, if Boeing had made the decision to make Maintenance Trainers for the 787 actually affordable (perhaps by lowering the overhead to own one by a million dollars, and actually enforcing requirements against uninitialized variables), maybe this could have been avoided.
 
Jarhyn, this old thread is about the 737 Max 8 crash 5 years ago. Barbos just picked it up, because it had "Boeing" in the title, but there is now a more current controversy surrounding the collapse in manufacturing safety standards across the company. That process began in the late 90s and has gradually reached the point where Boeing's reputation has been shredded by their obsession with cutting costs to the bare bone in order to maximize return on investment for major stockholders. The 737 debacle was part of that, but the company has gone downhill even more since then. Right now, they are scrambling to find any way to repair the damage without giving up their current culture of "shareholder value" dictating strategy. Ironically, it is that very culture that has posed the most serious challenge to the value of shares.

The design of the 737 Max was highly flawed--a very different type of aircraft kludged onto an old airframe that wasn't suited for the weight of the jumbo fuel-efficient engines. What I think you miss about the simulator issue, possibly because of your tendency to filter everything through your experiences with software engineering, was the root cause of the problem--competition with Airbus. Boeing won the footrace and grabbed market share by rushing a new model of aircraft into production too quickly. That was the reason for using an existing airframe rather than taking the time to design, test, and manufacture a new one. However, the difference between Airbus--a relatively new company--and Boeing--one of oldest aircraft manufacturers still in existence--has been that Airbus standardizes their flight deck (Boeing term for cockpit). Hence, simulators are easier and cheaper to produce for that company. Boeing's practice has always been to "improve" new product lines by building a new internal organization around the manufacture of a new aircraft. Hence, the flight deck and pilot controls tend to be redesigned every time. Standardization is extremely difficult every time you do that. In my 25 years at Boeing, I was involved in a number of new product lines, and I saw effort after effort fail. No matter how hard management tried to promote standards across product lines, they could never quite manage it.

The 737 Max 8 was marketed as having a flight deck that any 737 pilot could handle with minimal training--an attempt to beat Airbus at their own game when they released a new product. Pilot training for a new aircraft is extremely expensive for airlines. That was a lie, but airlines all bought into it, because the aircraft undersold the Airbus competition. Boeing erroneously maintained that new pilots did not need simulator training, and they didn't even have simulators to carry out proper training. That situation has been remedied over the past 5 years, but many other problems remain.
 
I'd wanted to start a thread on "Boeing Woes", so is this one suitable?

Boeing 737 MAX 9 door plug bolts appeared to be missing on Alaska jet, NTSB says | Reuters
A door panel that flew off a Boeing 737 MAX 9 jet mid-flight on Jan. 5 appeared to be missing four key bolts, according to a preliminary report from U.S. investigators that provided the first official look into how the frightening mishap took shape.

...
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report released on Tuesday focused on how the panel - fitted into this MAX 9 model in place of an optional exit - could have detached from the plane. The plug is held down by four bolts
, opens new tab and then secured by "stop fittings" at 12 different locations along the side of the plug and the door frame.

Representative Rick Larsen, the top Democrat on the committee overseeing the FAA, said the "failure to re-install bolts on a safety-critical component of this 737 MAX 9 aircraft is a serious error that signals larger quality control lapses that must be corrected."
 
Boeing whistleblower says he was pressured to hide defects | The Hill
noting
Whistleblower from Boeing supplier Spirit AeroSystems speaks out on quality issues - CBS News
For about a decade, Santiago Paredes worked at the end of the production line at the Spirit AeroSystems factory in Wichita, Kansas, doing final inspections on 737 fuselages before they were shipped to Boeing.

"If quality mattered, I would still be at Spirit," said Paredes, who told CBS News in an interview he was finding hundreds of defects every day. "It was very rare for us to look at a job and not find any defects."

...
"Why'd that happen? Because Spirit let go of a defect that they overlooked because of the pressure that they put on the inspectors," Paredes told CBS News. "If the culture was good, those issues would be addressed, but the culture is not good."

...
Paredes, who left the company in mid-2022, told CBS News that what he saw firsthand makes him hesitant to fly on those planes.

"Working at Spirit, I almost grew a fear of flying," said Paredes. "Knowing what I know about the 737, it makes me very uncomfortable when I fly on one of them."

...
CBS News spoke with several current and former Spirit AeroSystems employees and reviewed photos of dented fuselages, missing fasteners and even a wrench they say was left behind in a supposedly ready-to-deliver component. Paredes said Boeing knew for years Spirit was delivering defective fuselages.

"It's a recipe for disaster," Paredes told us. "I said it was just a matter of time before something bad happened. "
 
His bosses nicknamed SP "Showstopper" because of all the defects that he reported. In 2018, it got worse as the company went from making mid-30's of fuselages each month to more than 50 per month.
"They always said they didn't have time to fix the mistakes," said Paredes. "They needed to get the planes out."

In February 2022, Paredes said Spirit bosses asked him to speed up his inspections by being less specific about where exactly he was finding issues with fuselages. Paredes emailed his managers, writing the request was "unethical" and put him "in a very uncomfortable situation."

"I was put in a place where I had, if I say, no, I was gonna get fired," Paredes recalled. "If I say yes, I was admitting that I was gonna do something wrong."
The company demoted him for that, and after he filed an ethics complaint at the company's Human Resources department, he was reinstated. But a few months later, he quit and went to work for another Boeing subsidiary.
"Santiago Paredes is one of these brave whistleblowers who chose to come forward and speak publicly. His powerful story points to the need for accountability and responsibility in the aviation industry," his attorneys Brian Knowles and Robert Turkewitz told CBS News. "It is time for profits over safety, quality, and people to come to an end. Actions speak louder than words."

The lawyers say they are working with at least 10 former and current Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems employees who have raised safety concerns.
:eek:
 
I'd wanted to start a thread on "Boeing Woes", so is this one suitable?

Might as well use this one, since barbos resurrected it in a post that seemed to suggest that the recent deaths of a three whistle blowers was something more than coincidence. That was completely unrelated to the original thread topic.
 
Jarhyn, this old thread is about the 737 Max 8 crash 5 years ago. Barbos just picked it up, because it had "Boeing" in the title, but there is now a more current controversy surrounding the collapse in manufacturing safety standards across the company. That process began in the late 90s and has gradually reached the point where Boeing's reputation has been shredded by their obsession with cutting costs to the bare bone in order to maximize return on investment for major stockholders. The 737 debacle was part of that, but the company has gone downhill even more since then. Right now, they are scrambling to find any way to repair the damage without giving up their current culture of "shareholder value" dictating strategy. Ironically, it is that very culture that has posed the most serious challenge to the value of shares.

The design of the 737 Max was highly flawed--a very different type of aircraft kludged onto an old airframe that wasn't suited for the weight of the jumbo fuel-efficient engines. What I think you miss about the simulator issue, possibly because of your tendency to filter everything through your experiences with software engineering, was the root cause of the problem--competition with Airbus. Boeing won the footrace and grabbed market share by rushing a new model of aircraft into production too quickly. That was the reason for using an existing airframe rather than taking the time to design, test, and manufacture a new one. However, the difference between Airbus--a relatively new company--and Boeing--one of oldest aircraft manufacturers still in existence--has been that Airbus standardizes their flight deck (Boeing term for cockpit). Hence, simulators are easier and cheaper to produce for that company. Boeing's practice has always been to "improve" new product lines by building a new internal organization around the manufacture of a new aircraft. Hence, the flight deck and pilot controls tend to be redesigned every time. Standardization is extremely difficult every time you do that. In my 25 years at Boeing, I was involved in a number of new product lines, and I saw effort after effort fail. No matter how hard management tried to promote standards across product lines, they could never quite manage it.

The 737 Max 8 was marketed as having a flight deck that any 737 pilot could handle with minimal training--an attempt to beat Airbus at their own game when they released a new product. Pilot training for a new aircraft is extremely expensive for airlines. That was a lie, but airlines all bought into it, because the aircraft undersold the Airbus competition. Boeing erroneously maintained that new pilots did not need simulator training, and they didn't even have simulators to carry out proper training. That situation has been remedied over the past 5 years, but many other problems remain.
What I'm seeing here is significant admission that the expenses in simulator development (and the expenses in development of aircraft software that they did not foot properly) were directly related to my experiences, which were about 5-8 years ago.

Note that one of my principal complaints here was that not only did the software suck (and it did, and still does), but that Boeing was price gouging companies on simulators.

I'm going to note here that our product, which was priced out of smaller airlines, was in fact a maintenance simulator; if Boeing (mis)management had considered that affordable simulators were important, a number of these knock-on effects simply wouldn't exist.

Instead they considered it a cash grab.
 
What I'm seeing here is significant admission that the expenses in simulator development (and the expenses in development of aircraft software that they did not foot properly) were directly related to my experiences, which were about 5-8 years ago.

Note that one of my principal complaints here was that not only did the software suck (and it did, and still does), but that Boeing was price gouging companies on simulators.

I'm going to note here that our product, which was priced out of smaller airlines, was in fact a maintenance simulator; if Boeing (mis)management had considered that affordable simulators were important, a number of these knock-on effects simply wouldn't exist.

Instead they considered it a cash grab.

Not knowing the specifics of the story you are talking about, I have no opinion on its merits. I wouldn't be surprised to learn that Boeing was price gouging. They are a virtual monopoly, and their "shareholder value" strategy encouraged a predatory attitude to both cutting costs and raising revenue. That the company has been badly mismanaged for over two decades is an easy call in hindsight. However, I don't know why they failed to buy the particular product you were supporting. I do know that it cost them a lot to build simulators and that they were trying very hard to convince customers that the 787 Max 8 was just a modified up version of a 737 in terms of operations. When I retired in 2012, I was involved in a project with Operations manuals and invited to fly the simulator of the old 737. At that point, I heard about plans for the new the MCAS, but I didn't really know much about how that would affect flight operations.
 
What I'm seeing here is significant admission that the expenses in simulator development (and the expenses in development of aircraft software that they did not foot properly) were directly related to my experiences, which were about 5-8 years ago.

Note that one of my principal complaints here was that not only did the software suck (and it did, and still does), but that Boeing was price gouging companies on simulators.

I'm going to note here that our product, which was priced out of smaller airlines, was in fact a maintenance simulator; if Boeing (mis)management had considered that affordable simulators were important, a number of these knock-on effects simply wouldn't exist.

Instead they considered it a cash grab.

Not knowing the specifics of the story you are talking about, I have no opinion on its merits. I wouldn't be surprised to learn that Boeing was price gouging. They are a virtual monopoly, and their "shareholder value" strategy encouraged a predatory attitude to both cutting costs and raising revenue. That the company has been badly mismanaged for over two decades is an easy call in hindsight. However, I don't know why they failed to buy the particular product you were supporting. I do know that it cost them a lot to build simulators and that they were trying very hard to convince customers that the 787 Max 8 was just a modified up version of a 737 in terms of operations. When I retired in 2012, I was involved in a project with Operations manuals and invited to fly the simulator of the old 737. At that point, I heard about plans for the new the MCAS, but I didn't really know much about how that would affect flight operations.
Oh, that's the funny part: they did use the GHS RTOS for the flight control logic in particular.

The reason they went with VXWorks for the core rehost was, AFAICT, owing entirely to the fact that they started in VXWorks because the avionics industry has a boner for VXWorks and no other reason in particular.

My experience of Boeing was their conduct from 2013-2019. It was pretty clear to us that Boeing wanted to sell their own simulators, but that they were doing a horrendous job of it; whenever we requested updated rehost software packages, the releases were all over the place.

It got to the point where for 3 months my job was to RE the software they sent us so that I could specify specific features that the binaries had to have, like "no, the software you sent us on this date requires 0xfee1600d at offset 0x00000010, the version paired with it in the delivery you sent us contains 0xFee1baad"

Like, I can't imagine that, since they couldn't tell us which files belonged with which, because I had to use a debugger to RE from a warning message to a binary check, that they had any better idea either.

I'd be glad to discuss it more in private what the full situation was, but if I say another word here I'm going to end up doxing myself.
 
I don't think we need to get into the details. From your description, it sounds like a miscommunication problem, which can be common in contract language. If the contract contains ambiguity or vagueness, then very expensive mistakes happen. I know of some cases where that happened. For example, Boeing would order an external company to manufacture an assembly, but those writing up the contract would miss some essential requirement--for example that the parts be tested before assembly. I know of one case where an Italian company was hired to produce an assembly, but they couldn't assemble it without the proper testing equipment, which Boeing had. So the contractor shipped the unassembled kit, which met the contract requirements as written. The assembly couldn't be used by Boeing, because it had to be tested to verify it met the specifications that were required. If the parts didn't meet the specifications, then they would have needed to be retooled, but those receiving the kits were not in a position to assemble and test them. That company had a similar contract from a European company, but the European company had also provided the testing equipment to validate the assembly. Apparently, the Boeing buyer expected the contracted company to possess the requisite testing equipment.
 
I don't think we need to get into the details. From your description, it sounds like a miscommunication problem, which can be common in contract language. If the contract contains ambiguity or vagueness, then very expensive mistakes happen. I know of some cases where that happened. For example, Boeing would order an external company to manufacture an assembly, but those writing up the contract would miss some essential requirement--for example that the parts be tested before assembly. I know of one case where an Italian company was hired to produce an assembly, but they couldn't assemble it without the proper testing equipment, which Boeing had. So the contractor shipped the unassembled kit, which met the contract requirements as written. The assembly couldn't be used by Boeing, because it had to be tested to verify it met the specifications that were required. If the parts didn't meet the specifications, then they would have needed to be retooled, but those receiving the kits were not in a position to assemble and test them. That company had a similar contract from a European company, but the European company had also provided the testing equipment to validate the assembly. Apparently, the Boeing buyer expected the contracted company to possess the requisite testing equipment.
The contract in theory was simple: send us the software that the aircraft is to be deployed with, built with simulation hooks, as a comprehensive package.

It's not that hard of an ask, all things told.

Like, how hard is it to put together the list of signed software parts from a package release, especially since you use that same parts list for the simulator you plan on selling to your own customers?

Then, if they hadn't made simulators exorbitantly expensive through their data package licensing fees, maybe someone could have afforded to learn how to properly maintain an aircraft hatch.
 
Back
Top Bottom